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11. Abstract 
The problem of human error in healthcare is well documented.  Other domains (such as 
transportation and energy) have used techniques and methods from the engineering disciplines 
to analyze and ultimately reduce instances of error. In New York State (NYS), the Department of 
Health (DOH) requires the use of one such method, Root Cause Analysis (RCA), in 
investigating and reporting the occurrence of and response to Sentinel Events by hospitals.  
Despite the use of the RCA technique in an attempt to identify and mitigate the root causes of 
error, the problem of human error contributing to Sentinel Events persists. 
Experts in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) contend that human performance is too complex to 
be represented by models used in engineering systems reliability.  A method to analyze human 
erroneous actions was created that considers operator context and control based on a model of 
human cognition.  The technique, called the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM), was used to reanalyze 58 sentinel event cases Rochester General Hospital 
previously analyzed using RCA. 
Despite serious data limitations, our results reveal an apparent gap between RCA and CREAM 
analyses.  We suggest that the gap highlights incomplete RCA that minimizes or does not 
appreciate the role that organizational factors play in contributing to the Sentinel Events.  Due to 
data limitations, we cannot identify specific interventions to mitigate risk for Sentinel Events.  
However, we make several recommendations for improving the RCA process at Rochester 
General Hospital in an effort to improve the validity of the analyses data for further study. 
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Introduction 
Human error is a major problem in medicine, resulting in tens of thousands avoidable deaths and over 
a million excess injuries in a year in the U.S. alone (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2000). The authors of 
the Institute of Medicine reports cited two large studies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the 
other in New York. These studies found that adverse events occurred in 2.9 and 3.7 percent of 
hospitalizations, respectively. In Colorado and Utah hospitals 6.6 percent and in New York hospitals 13.6 
percent of adverse events led to death. In both studies, over half of these adverse events resulted from 
preventable medical errors. The report extrapolated from the New York numbers to estimate the 
nationwide number of deaths due to medical errors to be as high as 98,000, and estimated the total 
national costs (lost income, lost household production, disability and health care costs) of preventable 
medical errors resulting in injury to be between $17 billion and $29 billion, over half of which represent 
health care costs (IOM, 2000). 
Human error is also a problem in many other domains, particularly in aviation and in process control. 
However, domains such as nuclear power generation, for example, have enjoyed decades or research and 
development of effective error analysis methods and error prevention protocols. Human reliability 
analysis (HRA) is an engineering discipline that has been an integral part of nuclear and other high-risk 
industries since 1970s; there also exist myriad well-documented HRA techniques that are applicable to 
health care systems for identification of sources of human error and prevention of adverse consequences 
of errors (Kirwan, 1998). A key to the success of all these efforts is abandonment of the traditional view 
of human error as a cause of adverse consequences (e.g., to patient safety). Instead, human error should be 
viewed as a consequent itself, and research efforts should be focused on identification and elimination of 
the antecedents of human error. This was the explicit focus of our research as well. 
Publication of such seminal works as “To Err is Human” resulted in increased implementation of 
voluntary accident and incident reporting systems (IOM, 2000). In 2003, Rochester General Hospital 
(RGH) implemented a new web-based event reporting system, the Quantros Safety & Risk solution 
(Kumar & Carson-Martin, 2005). With this electronic incident reporting system, the number of events 
reported increased from 200 per month to about 450 per month in an 18-month period. Currently, events 
are reported at a rate of 600 to 620 per month, higher than the initial reporting rate, but showing a 
decreasing trend. A critical question is whether the decrease in reports reflects underreporting (cf. General 
Accounting Office, 1997) or a true reduction in incidents and mishaps. Alas, there is some evidence 
pointing to the former conclusion. The original reporting system at RGHS was Dr. Quality, which was 
purchased by Quantros in 2007. This change has led to some usability problems with the system’s 
interface, possibly resulting in decrease in its use. 
A new HRA technique titled Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) appears to 
be particularly well suited for health care applications. CREAM has been implemented in software that 
will allow subject matter experts (i.e., health care professionals) who may lack HRA training to conduct 
valid and reliable error analyses (Serwy & Rantanen, 2007). The purpose of this research was to evaluate 
these two very different approaches to event reporting and analysis, and to use both archival data and data 
collected during the project to examine the types and forms of human errors and their antecedents in heath 
care in general and within RGHS in particular. 
Quantros Safety & Risk Management (SRM) Application 
The Quantros event reporting system allows team members at RGH to use any computer in the 
organization to enter any event (actual or potential) that will affect the clinical outcome of a patient or 
poses a potential patient safety issue. The same event reporting system is also used to report employee 
events such as needle sticks, falls, sprains and strains, etc. The events entered are reviewed each morning 
by the Performance Improvement Coordinators and the event follow up is assigned at that time. Feedback 
is provided via e-mails to the unit manager or designee to notify them of the follow-up and date of 
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completion. Events concerning inpatients are reviewed and action plans developed by the appropriate 
Nurse Manager; employee events are reviewed and acted upon by the Employee Health Department. 
A performance improvement report is generated for all inpatient units that contain the unit specific 
harm events that were entered into Quantros. Monthly and quarterly reports are generated and reported to 
senior leadership, specific committees and the board of directors. These reports are downloaded put into 
excel spreadsheets, analyzed, and sent out in a PowerPoint packet with appropriate graphs and 
suggestions for improvement. 
The use of the Quantros event reporting system has been implemented at RGH and some affiliates, 
including a smaller acute hospital (150 beds) and a skilled nursing facility. The event reporting system 
contains information on patient falls, medication errors, mislabeled blood specimens, returns to the OR, 
pressure ulcer formation, failed devices, misdiagnosis, wrong patient events, disruptive behavior by 
professional staff, missing patient property, unexpected deaths, readmissions to the organization, all 
events are classified as actual or potential. The units/departments within the organization use these reports 
to identify opportunities for improvement organization wide as well as unit specific. 
Quantros SRM is a web-based application that allows healthcare organizations to capture self-
reported data on actual or perceived patient safety events. Quantros SRM is a customizable application.  
Users enter information into Quantros through a series of web forms through the application. The form 
content is dynamic and changes based on the event type being reported. Data fields required for 
completion of the submission form are determined by the organization pre-implementation as part of the 
application-specific parameters.  Event reports can be submitted anonymously. Data submitted into 
Quantros SRM can be aggregated with pre-defined application reports available to stakeholders within the 
organization. 
After an event is submitted in Quantros, notification occurs to certain administrative users within the 
organization (which may include the manager responsible for the unit on which the event was reported to 
have occurred).  This notification is a signal to organization stakeholders that an occurrence can be 
viewed within the Quantros SRM application. Following the notification, a stakeholder (designated as the 
Event Manager) assigns a classification to the event.  The Event Manager assigns the occurrence to a 
specific stakeholder (e.g., department manager) for investigation. Results from the investigation are 
entered into the application. The reports are considered "closed" when the event has been investigated and 
reviewed. 
Although Quantros has been widely implemented and used for a relatively long time, it has some 
problems that erode its usefulness in revealing and analysis of errors within the healthcare system. For 
example, it is believed that actual events are underreported by staff members. Anecdotal reasons for 
underreporting include (1) length of time required to complete an event submission, (2) perception of 
creation of "work" for supervisors (e.g., investigations, additional administrative tasks related to 
reporting, etc.), and (3) perception that other staff members will submit the event. It is difficult, however, 
to procure reliable statistics to further research these issues.  
Our experiences with Quantros also revealed that the data within this system lacked specificity and 
completeness, making it inadequate to meet the goals of our research. Consequently, other sources for 
data were explored.  
New York Patient Occurrence Reporting & Tracking System (NYPORTS) 
When a hospital becomes aware of a serious occurrence, the New York State Department of Health 
(NYS DOH) requires a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed by the hospital and submitted to the 
agency via the NYPORTS web database. The hospital enters data from a RCA using the NYPORTS 
Framework for Root Cause Analysis and Action Plan in Response to a Sentinel Event form. A RCA is 
mandated for specific occurrence codes listed in the NYPORTS Clinical Definitions Manual including 
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“unexpected adverse occurrence in circumstances other than those related to the natural course of illness, 
disease, or proper treatment (e.g., delay in treatment, diagnoses or an omission of care) in accordance 
with generally accepted medical standards” (NYS DOH, 2005, p. 13). Examples of occurrences requiring 
an RCA include: 
• Serious occurrence (voluntary) 
• Wrong patient/wrong site surgical procedure 
• Incorrect (invasive) procedure or treatment 
• Unintentionally retained foreign body 
• Unexpected death 
• Cardiac and/or respiratory arrest requiring ACLS intervention 
• Loss of limb or organ 
• Impairment of limb, organ, or body function 
• Fire or internal disaster 
• Equipment malfunction 
Due to the inadequacy of the data provided by the Quantros SRM application, we used the 
NYPORTS database to select cases for inclusion in this study. 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) refers to techniques that seek to model human error in the context 
of complex systems in similar terms as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which in turn refers to 
systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with complex engineered 
systems (Kolaczkowski et al., 2005). Serious criticism has, however, been leveled against many current 
HRA techniques: Human performance is typically too complex to be represented by models used for 
component and system reliability, that is, human actions and performance cannot be decomposed in a 
mechanical fashion. These shortcomings are shared by many different HRA techniques that Hollnagel 
(1998) has labeled collectively as “first-generation HRA”. Hollnagel (1998) also proposed an alternative 
approach to HRA, a “second-generation” technique, which explicitly and specifically considers the 
context of human performance and impact of contextual factors on human reliability. This technique is 
called Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM; Hollnagel, 1998). CREAM is meant to 
be both a predictive and retrospective analysis tool, that is, fully bidirectional, applying the same 
principles for either direction of analysis. The logic of this approach is that the same theory that goes into 
predicting an event must be consistent with explaining a past event. CREAM represents a departure from 
hierarchical classification for human error causes, which often fail to produce consistent hierarchies of 
human performance due to insufficient knowledge about the causes of human error, and which tend to be 
sequential (Hollnagel, 1998). 
Instead of the hierarchical and sequential approach, CREAM uses a recursive approach. Several 
tables interlink into each other through a set of rules for analysis, and each step offers several possibilities 
for proceeding. The context in which the erroneous action occurs helps simplify the analysis by helping 
indicate the more likely paths. This is an important consideration, for human actions never occur in a void 
but always within the context of the situation. CREAM organizes interactions between the human and the 
environment using the Human-Technology-Organization (HTO) triad. The conditions that shape context 
are called Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), and resemble the traditional performance shaping 
factors (PSFs) of other methods, such as the Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP; cf. 
Swain & Guttman, 1980). 
The CREAM technique, too, suffers from various shortcomings that limit its applicability in real-
world, operational settings (e.g., in health care). The method is quite tedious and time-consuming when 
done by hand because more than 15 tables need to be searched at each step and because of the rapid 
growth of branching points in the analysis. Consequently, there are few published human reliability 
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analyses or accident investigations that have used CREAM, or evaluations of the method using well-
documented case studies; rather, CREAM appears in the HRA literature merely on a conceptual level 
(e.g., Kirwan, 1998). 
CREAM Navigator 
Because of the aforementioned drawbacks of CREAM as well as its unique and very strong 
advantages, Serwy and Rantanen (2007) created a computer program that bypassed much of the 
tediousness of CREAM analysis and made the technique more user-friendly and usable. Javascript, 
coupled with HTML, offered a rapid prototyping solution for user interface design. Making the software 
exclusively web-based and cross-platform compatible allows for easy dissemination of the method 
without a need to install additional software. The simplicity of the CREAM software readily allows even 
novices to analyze events in much detail. However, in past evaluations of the CREAM method and the 
Navigator software it was clearly demonstrated that domain expertise must be the foundation for any 
useful analysis of complex systems. Therefore, further development of both the CREAM method and its 
software implementations must consider expert operators as the primary users, that is, people who have 
the necessarily intimate understanding of the systems they interact with but who lack expertise and need 
much guidance and support in the HRA process. 
Clear procedures for quantitative CREAM analysis are lacking at this time, with Hollnagel (1998) and 
Fujita and Hollangel (2004) offering different alternatives for quantification of human error probabilities. 
After all, it is here where the computational prowess of computers can be put to best use. The CREAM 
Navigator will hopefully provide for a useful testbed for research, development, and testing of 
quantitative methods within the CREAM technique. 
Purpose of the Research 
This project sought to create a systematic method for tracking and analyzing medical errors, which 
will lay the foundation for further research on identification of their antecedents, development of practical 
interventions, and validation of the effectiveness of the interventions. We began with existing and 
available incident reporting systems, Quantros, RCA, and a novel one, CREAM, and compared them to 
find ways to improve error analysis methods specifically for health care application and RGHS 
operations. 
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Method 
This research employed a descriptive design to analyze occurrences of sentinel events reported in the 
hospital (RGH) over the course of approximately six years. The occurrences were re-analyzed using the 
CREAM. Additionally, several RCA meetings were observed in situ to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
process. 
Materials 
Because the Quantros reports provided insufficient information for our purposes, our main source for 
data was archived RCA reports from the past several years (2004-2011). There reports were made 
available to us by RGH in hard copy format. They were reviewed on the RGH premises. 
Root Cause Analyses (RCA). Occurrences were analyzed using data submitted by the hospital to the 
New York State Department of Health according to the NYPORTS Framework for RCA and Action Plan 
in Response to a sentinel event.  NYPORTS is a secure database with access given only to authorized 
hospital employees. These RCA reports served as the primary source of data for this study. Secondary 
sources of data were observations of root cause analyses events conducted at the hospital.  
CREAM Navigator.  CREAM Navigator software was used to facilitate the retrospective analysis of 
events.  The CREAM Navigator (version 0.6) was obtained online at 
http://www.ews.uiuc.edu/~serwy/cream/.&nbsp. The software was developed and evaluated by Serwy 
and Rantanen (2007) and is available at no cost under the GNU General Public License. 
Design 
Metadata analysis and systematic observation were used as methods for obtaining descriptive data.  
Results included qualitative data from the examination of retrospective analyses of occurrences using the 
CREAM.  Descriptive statistics (e.g., frequency, mean, standard deviation) were used in further analyses 
of the metadata. 
Procedure 
Root Cause Analysis. RCA data were obtained through direct observation of RCA events and a 
review of historical RCA documents submitted to the NYPORTS database. The hospital supplied a list of 
reported sentinel event occurrences (by date) contained in the NYPORTS database. Cases were selected 
corresponding to the NYPORTS codes that required the organization to perform a RCA. The hospital 
printed the Framework for Root Cause Analysis and Action Plan in Response to a Sentinel Event report 
for each case selected.  Each report was reviewed and data from them entered into the CREAM Navigator 
for further analysis.  
Data on the RCA process were collected through observing RCA events at the hospital. Descriptive 
observations were recorded to (1) compare case elements discussed in the event to data elements reported 
in the final NYPORTS report submission and (2) analyze the effectiveness of the RCA process to make 
recommendations for improvement to the hospital team. 
Retrospective CREAM analysis. Cases reviewed from the NYPORTS database and observed in situ 
were also analyzed using the CREAM. Some cases had to be excluded from CREAM analysis because (1) 
the original hospital RCA team reported that the standard of care had been met with no opportunity for 
improvement or (2) observable error mode could be determined.  
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Results 
The Sample 
A total of 87 cases were reviewed from RCAs reported to the NYS DOH through the NYPORTS 
database. These cases represented adverse events in the hospital for a period of approximately 6 years 
(2004-2011). Of the 87 cases reviewed, 58 were re-analyzed using the CREAM; 29 cases were excluded 
due to a lack of identifiable error mode. In most of the latter cases, the RCA team concluded that the 
appropriate standards of care were met with no opportunities for improvement, and hence there was no 
error to be analyzed in CREAM. Table 1 depicts the number of cases reviewed by year; 2004 and 2011 
are partial years.  
Table 1 
Number of Cases Analyzed by Year. 
Year  N (RCA)  N (CREAM) 
2004  4  2 
2005  11  8 
2006  14  10 
2007  6  6 
2008  14  8 
2009  17  12 
2010  16  8 
2011  5  4 
Total 87 58 
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Root Cause Analyses (RCA) 
Archived RCA reports of sentinel events reports covered a period of approximately 7 years (from 
early 2004 through early 2011). These events were reported to the NYS DOH using the NYPORTS.  
Table 2 presents the number of events by type. Note that the majority of cases analyzed by both RCA and 
CREAM were unexpected death (915) and unintentionally retained foreign body (913). 
The NYPORTS framework for compiling data on RCA activities is separated into 6 main categories 
of Aspect for Analysis, (1) policy or process, (2) human resource factors and issues, (3) environment of 
care/equipment/supplies, (4) information management and communication issues, (5) leadership 
(corporate culture), and (6) other. When an RCA investigation of an event is conducted in the hospital, 
causes leading to the occurrence are identified within these 6 categories. Table 3 lists the numbers of 
Aspects for Analysis reported by the hospital in the archived RCAs reviewed. Policy or process dominated 
both analyses, followed by information management and communication issues. 
Table 2 
Number of Cases Analyzed by RCA and CREAM by NYPORTS Code. 
  RCA CREAM 
NYPORTS Code Code Description  N  %  N % 
901 Serious occurrence (voluntary reporting)  4  4.60  4  6.90  
911 Wrong Patient, Wrong Site Surgical Procedure  2  2.30  2  3.45  
912 Incorrect Invasive Procedure or Treatment  4  4.60  4  6.90  
913 Unintentionally Retained Foreign Body  16  18.39  15  25.86  
915 Unexpected Death  48  55.17  26  44.83  
916 Cardiac and/or Respiratory Arrest Requiring ACLS Intervention  7  8.05  4  6.90  
917 Loss of Limb or Organ  0  0  0  0  
918 Impairment of Limb, Organ, or Body Function  3  3.45  1  1.72  
935 Fire or Internal Disaster  1  1.15  0  0  
938 Equipment Malfunction  2  2.30  2  3.45  
Total  87 100.00 58 100.00 
 
Table 3 
Number of Cases Analyzed by RCA and CREAM by Aspects for Analysis. 
 RCA CREAM 
Aspect for Analysis  N  %  N  %  
Policy or Process  126  45.65  120  45.80  
Human Resource Factors & Issues  38  13.77  36  13.74  
Environment of Care/Equipment/Supplies  21  7.61  19  7.25  
Information Management & Communication Issues  87  31.52  83  31.68  
Leadership (Corporate Culture)  1  0.36  1  0.38  
Other  3  1.09  3  1.15  
Total 87 100.00 58 100.00 
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Cognitive Reliability & Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). CPCs were rated for each case. The nine CPCs are  (1) 
adequacy of organization, (2) working conditions, (3) adequacy of man-machine interface 
(MMI)/operational support, (4) availability of procedures/plans, (5) number of simultaneous goals, (6) 
available time, (7) time of day, (8) adequacy of training/experience, and (9) crew collaboration quality. 
Table 4 
Ratings of the Common Performance Conditions (CPC) of CREAM by CPC Category. 
CPC Rating  N % 
Adequacy of Organization Efficient  6  10.3  
 Inefficient  26  44.8  
 Deficient  26  44.8  
Working Conditions Advantageous  2  3.4  
 Compatible  40  69.0  
 Incompatible  16  27.6  
Adequacy of MMI/Operational Support Supportive  1  1.7  
 Tolerable  34  58.6  
 Inappropriate  23  39.7  
Availability of Procedures/Plans Acceptable  6  10.3  
 Inappropriate  52  89.7  
Number of Simultaneous Goals Fewer than capacity  4  6.9  
 Matching current capacity  33  56.9  
 More than capacity  21  36.2  
Available Time Adequate  28  48.3  
 Temporarily inadequate  29  50.0  
 Continuously inadequate  1  1.7  
Time of Day Day-time  40  69.0  
 Night-time  18  31.0  
Adequacy of Training/Experience Adequate - high experience  11  19.0  
 Adequate - limited experience  39  67.2  
 Inadequate  8  13.8  
Crew Collaboration Quality Efficient  7  12.1  
 Inefficient  32  55.2  
 Deficient  19  32.8  
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Impact of CPCs on reliability. According to CREAM, individual CPCs can have one of three 
impacts on reliability:  (1) reliability improved, (2) reliability not significant, or (3) reliability reduced.  
When the CPCs are rated, CREAM presents a frequency of CPCs according to impact. The sum of these 
impacts is used to calculate the Operator Control Mode. Two CPCs do not have the ability to improve 
reliability, while all 9 CPCs can either reduce reliability or have an effect that is not significant. Table 5 
presents the number of cases where reliability was influenced by the CPCs and Table 6 the resulting 
operator control modes in the cases analyzed. 
Table 5 
Number of Common Performance Conditions That Improved, Reduced, or Had No Effect on Reliability. 
 Improved Reliability Reduced Reliability No Sig. Effect on Reliability 
No. CPCs N  %  N % N % 
0 26  44.8  0  0  0  0  
1 23  39.7  2  3.4  0  0  
2 8  13.8  3  5.2  3  5.2  
3 1  1.7  16  27.6  19  32.8  
4 0  0  12  20.7  17  29.3  
5 0  0  14  24.1  11  19.0  
6 0  0  9  15.5  5  8.6  
7 0  0  2  3.4  2  3.4  
8   0  0  1  1.7  
9   0  0  0  0  
 
Table 6  
Operator Control Mode 
Operator Control Mode  N  %  
Scrambled  11  19.0 
Opportunistic  36  62.1  
Tactical  11  19.0  
 
In the vast majority of cases we reanalyzed, the operator control mode was either opportunistic or 
scrambled (81.1%), posing a serious threat to the operation. Even more striking result is the nearly 20% of 
cases where the operator control mode was scrambled, indicating an almost total loss of control in the 
situation. 
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Error modes. The CREAM analysis of the 58 archived RCA cases identified 80 specific error 
modes. In CREAM, error modes belong to one of four types of errors: (1) action at wrong time, (2) action 
at wrong type, (3) action at wrong object, and (4) action in wrong place. Specific errors within the 
category of action at wrong time include timing and duration.  Errors within the category of action at 
wrong type include force, distance/magnitude, speed, and direction. Wrong object is the error within the 
category of action at wrong object while sequence is the error within the category of action in wrong 
place.  The numbers of each error mode is presented in Table 7.  Within the 80 error modes identified the 
error modes of Timing and Sequence accounted for over 73.75% of the errors (with 31.25% and 42.50%, 
respectively). 
Table 7 
CREAM Error Modes in the Cases Analyzed 
Error Mode Classification  N  % Total Errors  
Action at Wrong Time  30  37.5  
Action at Wrong Type  6  7.5  
Action at Wrong Object  10  12.5  
Action in Wrong Place  34  42.5  
 
Antecedents. Antecedents in CREAM are grouped according to categories in the HTO triad 
(representing Human, Technology, and Organizational factors).  As part of the CREAM analysis of the 58 
archived RCA cases, a total of 536 antecedents (general direct and general indirect) were identified 
contributing to the 80 error modes.  Table 8 reports the frequency of antecedents within each of the HTO 
categories. 
Table 8 
Number of Antecedents by Classification Group 
Antecedent Classification Group  N  % Total  
Human  150  27.98  
Technology  105  19.58  
Organization  281  52.42  
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Within the Human part of the triad, the antecedent genotypes are divided into categories of (1) 
observation, (2) interpretation, (3) planning, (4) temporary person-related functions, and (5) permanent 
person-related functions.  Of the 150 antecedents, Table 9 shows the number of antecedents within each 
of these categories. Inadequate Plan ranked as the most frequent antecedent (67) followed by Faulty 
Diagnosis (17) and Observation Missed (17).  
Table 9 
Number of Antecedents in the Human Genotype Classification Group 
Antecedent Category  Frequency (n = 150) %  
Observation  27 18.00  
Observation missed 17 11.33 
False observation 1 0.66 
Wrong identification 9 6.00 
Interpretation  19 12.66 
Faulty diagnosis 17 11.33 
Wrong reasoning 2 1.33 
Decision error 0 0.00 
Delayed interpretation 0 0.00 
Incorrect prediction 0 0.00 
Planning  67 44.66  
Inadequate plan 67 44.66 
Priority error 0 0.00 
Temporary person-related functions  31 20.66  
Memory failure 9 6.00 
Fear 0 0.00 
Distraction 12 8.00 
Fatigue 1 0.66 
Performance variability 4 2.66 
Inattention 5 3.33 
Physiological stress 0 0.00 
Psychological stress 0 0.00 
Permanent person-related functions  6 4.00  
Functional impairment 0 0.00 
Cognitive style 0 0.00 
Cognitive bias 6 4.00 
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Within the Technology part of the triad, the antecedent genotypes are divided into categories of (1) 
components, (2) procedures, (3) temporary interface problems, and (4) permanent interface problems.  Of 
the 105 antecedents (Table 10). Inadequate Procedure ranked as the most frequent antecedent (94) 
followed by Equipment Failure (6) and Access Limitations (2). 
Table 10 
Number of Antecedents in the Technology Genotype Classification Group 
Antecedent Category  Frequency (n = 105)  % Total  
Equipment failure  6  5.71  
Equipment failure 6 5.71 
Software failure 0 0.00 
Procedures  94  89.52  
Inadequate procedures 94 89.52 
Temporary interface problems  3  2.86  
Access limitations 2 1.90 
Ambiguous information 0 0 
Incomplete information 1 0.95 
Permanent interface problems  2  1.90  
Access problems 1 0.95 
Mislabeling 1 0.95 
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Within the Organization part of the triad, the antecedent genotypes are divided into categories of (1) 
communication, (2) organization, (3) training, (4) ambient conditions, and (5) working conditions.  Of the 
281 antecedents, Design Failure ranked as the most frequent antecedent (64) followed by Inadequate 
Quality Control (53), and Communication Failure (45) (Table 11). 
Table 11 
Number of Antecedents in the Organization Genotype Classification Group 
Antecedent Category  Frequency (n = 281)  %  
Communication  50  17.79  
Communication failure 45 16.01 
Missing information 5 1.78 
Organization  159  56.58  
Maintenance failure 3 1.07 
Inadequate quality control 53 18.86 
Management problem 31 11.03 
Design failure 64 22.78 
Inadequate task allocation 5 1.78 
Social pressure 3 1.07 
Training  34  12.10  
Insufficient skills 3 1.07 
Insufficient knowledge 31 11.03 
Ambient conditions  27  9.60  
Temperature 0 0.00 
Sound 1 0.36 
Humidity 0 0.00 
Illumination 0 0.00 
Other 13 4.63 
Adverse ambient conditions 13 4.63 
Working conditions  11  3.91  
Excessive demand 8 2.85 
Inadequate workplace layout 1 0.36 
Inadequate team support 1 0.36 
Irregular working hours 1 0.36 
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Analyses of Cases by Event Type 
We did separate CREAM analyses on the top two sentinel event types.  Unexpected death 
(NYPORTS code 915) accounted for 26 cases (44.93%) and Unintentionally retained foreign body 
(NYPORTS code 913) for 15 cases (25.86%).  All of the remaining event types contained less than 5 
cases each. 
Table 12 
Number of Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained Foreign Bodies by Year in the Cases 
Reviewed. 
 Unexpected Death (NYPORTS Code 915) Unint. Retained Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Year  N  %  N % 
2004  1  3.84  1  6.66  
2005  3  11.54  3  20.00  
2006  7  26.92  2  13.33  
2007  2  7.69  2  13.33  
2008  1  3.84  2  13.33  
2009  8  30.76  2  13.33  
2010  3  11.54  0  0.00  
2011  1  3.84  3  20.00  
 
Table 13 
RCA Aspects for Analysis by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained Foreign Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Year  N  %  N % 
Policy or Process  56  43.41 26  52.00 
Human Resource Factors & Issues  14  10.85  6  12.00  
Environment of Care/Equipment/Supplies  12  9.30  4  8.00  
Information Management & Communication Issues  46  35.66  14  28.00  
Leadership (Corporate Culture)  1  0.78  0  0.00  
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Table 14 
CREAM Error Modes by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained Foreign Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Error Mode Classification  N  %  N % 
Action at Wrong Time  23  58.97  1  5.00  
Action at Wrong Type  1  2.56  4  20.00  
Action at Wrong Object  1  2.56  0  0.00  
Action in Wrong Place  14  35.90  15  75.00 
 
As part of the CREAM analysis of the 26 archived RCA cases coded as unexpected death, a total of 
264 antecedents (general direct and general indirect) were identified contributing to the 39 error modes 
present (Table 15). 
Table 15 
CREAM Antecedent Classification Groups by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained Foreign 
Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Antecedent Classification Group N  %  N % 
Human  62  23.48  46  36.22  
Technology  55  20.83  20  15.74  
Organization  147  55.68  61  48.03  
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Within the 62 Human genotype antecedents, Inadequate Plan ranked as the most frequent antecedent 
(31) followed by Faulty Diagnosis (12) and Cognitive Bias (5) (Table 16). 
Table 16 
CREAM Antecedents in the Human Genotype Class by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained 
Foreign Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Antecedent Category  Freq. (n = 62) %  Freq. (n = 46) % 
Observation  6  9.68  12  26.08  
Observation missed 4 6.45 10 21.74 
False observation 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Wrong observation 2 3.23 2 4.35 
Interpretation  13  20.96  3  6.52  
Faulty diagnosis 12 19.35 2 4.35 
Wrong reasoning 1 1.61 1 2.17 
Decision error 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Delayed interpretation 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Incorrect prediction 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Planning  31  50.00  17  36.96  
Inadequate plan 31 50.00 17 36.96 
Priority error 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Temporary person-related functions  7  11.29  14  30.44  
Memory failure 3 4.84 2 4.35 
Fear 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Distraction 1 1.61 7 15.22 
Fatigue 1 1.61 0 0.00 
Performance variability 2 3.23 2 4.35 
Inattention 0 0.00 3 6.52 
Physiological stress 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Psychological stress 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Permanent person-related functions  5  8.06  0  0.00  
Functional impairment 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Cognitive style 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Cognitive bias 5 8.06 0 0.00 
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Within the 55 Technology genotype antecedents, Inadequate Procedure ranked as the most frequent 
antecedent (94) followed by Equipment Failure (6) and Access Limitations (2) (Table 17). 
Table 17 
CREAM Antecedents in the Technology Class by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained 
Foreign Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Antecedent Category  Freq. (n = 55) %  Freq. (n = 20) % 
Equipment/Components  2  3.64  1  5.00  
Equipment failure 2 3.64 1 5.00 
Software fault 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Procedures  49  89.09  19 95.00  
Inadequate procedures 49 89.09 19 95.00 
Temporary interface problems  3  5.46  0  0.00  
Access limitations 2 3.64 0 0.00 
Ambiguous information 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Incomplete information 1 1.82 0 0.00 
Permanent interface problems  1  1.82  0  0.00  
Access problems 1 1.82 0 0.00 
Mislabeling 0 0.00 0 0.00 
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Within the 147 organization genotype antecedents, Design Failure ranked as the most frequent 
antecedent (39) followed by Inadequate Quality Control (26), and Communication Failure (22) (Table 
18).  
Table 18 
CREAM Antecedents in the Organization Class by Unexpected Deaths and Unintentionally Retained 
Foreign Bodies 
 Unexpected Death (Code 915) Foreign Body (Code 913) 
Antecedent Category Freq. (n = 147) %  Freq. (n = 61 ) % 
Communication  25  17.00  7  11.48  
Communication failure    22    14.97    6    9.84    
Missing information    3    2.04    1    1.64 
Organization  89  60.54  32  52.46  
Maintenance failure    1    0.68    1    1.64 
Inadequate quality control    26    17.69    11    18.03 
Management problem    19    12.93    8    13.11 
Design failure    39    26.53    12    19.67 
Inadequate task allocation    3    2.04    0    0.00 
Social pressure    1    0.68    0    0.00 
Training  19  12.92  8  13.12  
Insufficient skills    0    0.00    2    3.28 
Insufficient knowledge    19    12.93    6    9.84 
Ambient conditions  8  5.44  13  21.31  
Temperature    0    0.00    0    0.00 
Sound    0     0.00    0    0.00 
Humidity    0    0.00    0    0.00 
Illumination    0    0.00    0    0.00 
Other    4    2.72    7    11.48 
Adverse ambient conditions    4    2.72    6    9.84 
Working conditions  6  4.08  1  1.64  
Excess demand    5    3.40    0    0.00 
Inadequate workplace layout    1    0.68    0    0.00 
Inadequate team support    0    0.00    0    0.00 
Irregular working hours    0    0.00   1    1.64 
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Discussion 
Data Limitations 
There were substantial limitations in the data available for this research. The archived RCAs reviewed 
included several discrepancies, including checkboxes for Aspects for Analysis that sometimes did not 
agree with written statements in the report and some root cause statements and measures of effectiveness 
were incomplete or missing. We obviously had no knowledge of the original facts (e.g. interviews/ 
witnesses/data) in the RCA process and had to rely solely on the written reports, despite—and 
including—the aforementioned corruption. We also encountered several incomplete RCAs (e.g. listing 
human error as a cause). The RCAs we observed revealed more details of the events for additional 
analysis. As observers, we could not ask questions or influence the process in any way, however, and 
these sessions tended to be more of an informal discussion rather than a structured activity, which limited 
the quality of data available for further analyses. Despite these limitations, our CREAM analyses revealed 
some very clear trends and pointed to specific antecedents that could guide design and implementation of 
interventions. 
Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) 
For each case, the context of the event in which the team members (operators) functioned was 
described in CREAM by rating Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). Each of the CPCs was rated 
based on the content of the archived RCA documents. In the event that specific information did not exist 
in the RCA document relating to the individual CPC, the rating that did not have an effect on reliability 
was selected. For example, if the CPC “Working Conditions” is rated as “Advantageous”, reliability will 
be improved.  If the CPC “Working Conditions” is rated as “Compatible”, reliability is not significantly 
impacted.  If the CPC “Working Conditions” is rated as “Incompatible”, reliability will be reduced.  
Therefore, in cases where no information was present in the RCA report with respect to working 
conditions, the CPC “Working Conditions” was rated as “Compatible”. 
Most notable among the CPCs that signaled a reduction in performance reliability, “Adequacy of 
Organization” was rated as “inefficient” or “deficient” in 89.6% of cases. The CPC “Availability of 
Procedures/Plans” was rated as “Inappropriate” in 89.7% of cases and “Crew Collaboration Quality” 
“Inefficient” or “Deficient” in 88.0% of cases. Altogether 91.3% of cases had three or more CPCs that 
were rated as reducing reliability.  Only a single case (1.7%) had three or more CPC’s that were rated as 
improving reliability.  
Operator Control Mode 
The operator control mode attempts to characterize operator performance within a specific level of 
control.  According to Hollnagel (1998), operator control modes are classified along a continuum (with 
operators moving between control modes) as (1) scrambled, (2) opportunistic, (3) tactical, and (4) 
strategic. Hollnagel equated effective control with the ability of an operator to plan within a given 
context. Operators in the scrambled control mode have low performance reliability and opportunistic 
control mode is associated with medium performance reliability. Tactical and strategic control modes 
relate to higher performance reliability.  In the vast majority of cases we reanalyzed, the operator control 
mode was either opportunistic or scrambled (81.1%), posing a serious threat to operation. Even more 
striking is nearly 20% of cases where the operator control mode was scrambled, indicating an almost total 
loss of control in the situation.  
Organizational Factors 
Within CREAM, antecedents “give rise” to consequents. Therefore, retrospective analysis of an event 
begins by describing an error mode. Antecedents, which gave rise to the error mode, are selected in an 
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iterative process until a “stop-rule” is employed or no further antecedents can be identified. The stop-rule 
ends the analysis for a given node. For example, in a hypothetical error where an operator selected the 
wrong object for use, the error mode would be “Wrong Object”.  The antecedent “Wrong identification” 
might be selected because the operator jumped to a conclusion and selected the wrong object. The 
antecedent “Inadequate Plan” might be selected as the antecedent which gave rise to the wrong 
identification which gave rise to the error mode of wrong object (and so on). 
Antecedents were categorized in three classification groups: (1) Human, (2) Technology, and (3) 
Organization (the HTO triad).  In the cases we reanalyzed, organizational factors accounted for the largest 
number of antecedents (52.4%). Within the Human classification group, antecedents related to planning 
accounted for 44.7% of cases. Antecedents relating to procedures were almost 90% of the Technology 
classification group. 
Event Type-Specific Antecedents 
Analyses on two specific types of events (unexpected death and unintentionally retained foreign 
body) were conducted as all other event types had fewer than five cases in the time period under review.  
Within the unintentionally retained foreign body cases, there is a slight increase in the number of 
antecedents classified in the Human group (36.2%) compared to the same classification group in the 
unexpected death cases (23.5%). In the Human classification group, more antecedents related to 
observation (26.1%) and temporary person-related functions (30.4%) were identified in the 
unintentionally retained foreign body cases (compared to 9.7% and 11.3%, respectively in unexpected 
death cases). Additionally, in the Organization classification group, the unintentionally retained foreign 
body cases saw a slight increase in the number of antecedents related to ambient conditions (21.3%) 
compared to unexpected death cases (5.4%). 
Comparing RCA Aspect for Analysis to CREAM Results 
Within the NYPORTS framework, the Aspects for Analysis are fairly broad and ill-defined. For 
analyses, it would be helpful to have more precision in the definition of each aspect listed in the Aspects 
for Analysis. Without such precision, it is questionable if inter-rater agreement exists in the completion of 
the NYPORTS RCA documents among various staff members. However, our results suggest that there 
might be a distinctive bias in the RCA event/process. For example, “Leadership (Corporate Culture)” was 
listed as an aspect for analysis in the RCA documents only once (0.4%) in the all the cases we reanalyzed. 
However, the CREAM analyses found more than half (52.4%) of the antecedents associated with error 
modes in cases belonged to the organizational classification group.  Further analyses should focus on 
exploring the specific organizational antecedents (factors) within the cases. 
Interventions 
The practical goal for the use of any error analysis method is to be able to identify or develop 
interventions which lead to mitigation of the factors contributing to reduced performance reliability and 
erroneous action. In the current study, the data limitations within the RCA process cast serious doubt on 
the ability of either the Root Cause or CREAM analyses to be able to offer insight into specific root 
causes or antecedents contributing to reduced performance and erroneous actions with validity. Our study 
offers insight into the role that the Operator Control Mode and CPC’s have on performance reliability.  
The results also suggest some degree of bias in past event analyses where organizational factors were not 
recognized as proximate or root causes during RCA events. We offer several recommendations for 
improving the RCA process as a means to increase the quality of the data in order to improve the RCA 
and CREAM analyses to ultimately arrive at specific and credible interventions that will improve 
performance reliability and reduce events. 
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 Conclusion 
The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) was used to re-analyze occurrences 
reported to the NYS DOH via the NYPORTS database. CREAM not only provided a structured way to 
describe the context in which the event occurred (through rating the CPCs), but also provided further 
causal insight into the cognitive functions (i.e., lack of available plans) which contributed to some of the 
error modes. The CREAM analyses provided different information than what was arrived at using the 
RCA method employed by the hospital.  
Our aggregate CREAM analyses of the archived RCA's exposed a gap between the NYPORTS 
Aspects for Analysis and CREAM antecedents. This gap suggests that organizational and leadership 
factors/antecedents may not be adequately considered in the RCA process due to incomplete RCA 
analysis of proximate causes. We think that further analysis of sentinel events and other serious 
occurrences using CREAM should be continued. Further analyses should focus on inter-rater 
reliability/agreement and incorporating prospective analyses of high-risk process or repeat Sentinel or 
other serious events. Additional effort should also include identifying interventions that will help mitigate 
antecedents giving rise to event error modes. 
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Recommendations 
Based on our research we offer several recommendations: 
RCA process:  
1.  Perform the RCA with more structure and add elements such as "5-Why's" to force deeper 
exploration/discussion of proximate causes. 
2. Whenever possible, conduct the RCA with the staff members who participated in/witnessed the event. 
3. Work to minimize the authority gradient within the meeting. 
4. Facilitation should ensure that each participant has an equal opportunity to participate (rather than the 
conversation being directed primarily by senior leaders). 
5. Separate "fact" from "speculation" clearly within the RCA process and document as such. 
6. Tie action steps to specific and measurable outcomes and include plan for continued follow-up. 
7. Consider performing a CREAM analysis before the RCA to:  (1) help structure interviews and fact-
finding before the event and (2) ensure more complete data. 
B. Further Analyses 
8. Consider aggregate RCA's for events that consistently occur over a period of time (repeat events) 
despite efforts to mitigate. 
9. Instead of analyzing "failures", also analyze "good catches" and instances where the action was 
"optimal" - this will offer a more complete picture of sources of variance and risk. 
10. For repeat types of events, perform a prospective analysis (e.g. CREAM or FMEA).  
NYPORTS form 
11. Consider creating more precise definitions for Aspects for Analysis to ensure consistency in 
completing the checklist. 
12. Ensure the Aspects for Analysis checklist matches the narrated portion of the report. 
13. Consider adding addendums to the NYPORTS case submission which document outcome of efforts 
to implement measures and results of follow-up. 
Organizational 
14. Consider educating quality staff/leaders on the role of bias in decision-making. 
15. Explore the role organizational and leadership factors play in events (e.g., identify and document 
organizational/cultural barriers). 
16. Continue to analyze RCA events on an aggregate basis vs. an individual basis. 
17. Research ways to improve validation of error rate (i.e. using other administrative/coding data to 
identify events). 
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